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I discuss three aspects of the notion of agency from the standpoint of physics: (i) what makes a
physical system an agent; (ii) the reason for agency’s time orientation; (iii) the source of the infor-
mation generated in choosing an action. I observe that agency is the breaking of an approximation
under which dynamics appears closed. I distinguish different notions of agency, and observe that
the answer to the questions above differ in different cases. I notice a structural similarity between
agency and memory, that allows us to model agency, trace its time asymmetry to thermodynami-
cal irreversibility, and identify the source of the information generated by agency in the growth of
entropy. Agency is therefore a physical mechanism that transforms low entropy into information.
This may be the general mechanism at the source of the whole information on which biology builds.
I. THE PROBLEM
Agency is the possibility for an agent to act on the
world, and affect it. The notion of agency is used in
a variety of contexts, with variable meanings. Agents
play a role in areas spacing from economy to theology.
They are increasingly utilised in foundational contexts,
for instance in discussing the conceptual basis of thermo-
dynamics [1, 2], quantum mechanics [3], causality [4–7],
even the foundations of physics itself [8].
Agency raises three questions for a physicist. First,
how to understand the assumed independence of the
agent and its possibility of alternative choices, given that
real agents are themselves physical systems that do not
violate laws of nature. Second, agency affects the future,
not the past: what is the origin of the time asymmetry,
considering that the elementary laws of physics are in-
variant under time reversal? Third, an agent can choose
alternative courses of action and the choice generates in-
formation: an agent can pick one among N alternatives,
generating I = log
2
N bits of information. Where does
this information originate from?
Here I consider a solutions to these three questions.
On various other recent physical perspectives on agency,
see [9–12] and references therein. A perspective similar
to the one considered here has been independently de-
veloped very recently by Barry Loewer in [13]. I give for
understood that nothing in agency conflicts with known
laws of nature; but understanding how the actual be-
haviour that we denote agency can be accounted for in
terms of these laws is something that requires a bit of
thinking. This is what is done here.
To this end, I consider a general characterisation of
agency, but also distinguish distinct manners in which
the notion of agency is intended and used. These cap-
ture different degrees of the independence, or freedom,
we attribute to the agent.
To account for agency’s time asymmetry we cannot re-
cur to the time orientation of the agent’s perspective (as
is done in many contexts), because this is what we want
to account for, not to assume. The only viable alterna-
tive is to trace it to the manifest time-asymmetry of the
macroscopic world. This, in turn, is accounted for by the
second principle of thermodynamics, widely understood;
by which I mean here the genericity assumption of statis-
tical physics plus (the non-genericity assumption of) the
past hypothesis [14], namely the fact that entropy was
low in the past. The time orientation of agency must be
ultimately rooted in the second principle because there is
nothing else at our disposal [15, 16]. As we shall see, how-
ever, this is realised indirectly and in different ways for
different kinds of agencies. The core of the paper is Sec-
tion IV, where I show how the dots between thermody-
namics and agency can be filled-in, using a simple model
that illustrates how entropy growth can drive agency.
The model presented here derives from a structural
similarity between agency and memory, and a recent re-
sults on the relation between memory and entropy [17].
In particular, the model yields a thermodynamical bound
on the information produced in agency, tying the gener-
ation of information to thermodynamical parameters.
Memory and agency can thus be viewed as mechanisms
that convert free energy into information. This may well
be the primary source of the information the biosphere,
the brain, and culture, deal with.
II. THE AGENT AS A PHYSICAL SYSTEM
The key to address the nature of agency, is to recognise
that agency does not refer solely to events in the world:
it refers to a manner of description of these events. The
notion of agency is grounded in ignoring physical links,
namely some of the physical (deterministic or probabilis-
tic) correlations described by the physical laws.
A. Agency is disregarding physical links
To illustrate this idea, consider the use of agency in
the foundations of thermodynamics or quantum theory.
A fertile formulation of both of these theories is to see
2them describing the response of physical systems (ther-
modynamical or quantum) when they are acted upon in
certain manners. For instance: ‘If we compress the vol-
ume of a gas, the temperature increases so and so’. Or:
‘If we prepare a q-bit in this state, and then measure this
spin, we obtain this number’. These are descriptions of
behaviours of a part of the world, when an agent acts
on it one way or the other. The language of agency is
explicit in numerous presentations of these theories, and
is sometimes deemed essential.
A moment of reflection, however, shows that this lan-
guage can be translated away. Any occurrence of ‘if an
agent acts on the system in this and that manner’ can
be translated into a statement of the form ‘if the system
happens to interact in this and that manner’; thus trad-
ing the independence of the agent with the modality that
is at the basis of all physical laws.
Physical laws, indeed, refer to regularities, namely to
repetitive behaviour happening under repeated circum-
stances. They are generically of the form ‘Anytime that
A then also B’, or ‘anytime that A then the probability of
B is so and so’. The ‘anytime’ is a conditional (‘if’). The
phase space of classical mechanics and the Hilbert space
of quantum theory are spaces of possibilities, where the
conditionals reside. Laws have been found, in principle,
by generalisation and induction out of a number of re-
peated observations. Hence the notion of an agent ‘free
to act’ is actually irrelevant in the foundations of ther-
modynamics and quantum theory: it can be replaced by
the conditional: ‘whenever this, then that’.
But the opposite is equally true. And it is more inter-
esting. Precisely because physics is modal in this manner,
we can always replace the conditionals with the action of
an independent agent. And express the arbitrariness by
attributing it to something that we call ‘agency’. There-
fore the agent is here simply the place where we arbitrar-
ily decide to start the sequence of correlations described
by the laws we are interested in: it is, in other words,
where we ignore previous physical links.
To illustrate this, consider for instance the statement
that the temperature of a mass of real gas increases when
compressed. The compression is due to the interaction
between the gas and some other physical system. This
other physical system can be a human agent freely decid-
ing to push a piston; but also the wind pushing a mass
of atmospheric air downhill along a mountain. For the
gas, which is what is being considered, the difference is
irrelevant: the human and the wind are ‘agents’. What
makes them agents, here, is simply the fact that in de-
scribing the behaviour of the gas we are not interested in
the chain of physical links they might happen to follow:
these are treated as external, arbitrary. It is this that
makes them agents here: ignoring their physics.
This is in fact general. Agency is always associated
to the boundaries of an incomplete or approximate de-
scription of the world, within which physical links are to
some extent closed, namely approximately sufficient to
account for the evolution. It refers to the spots where
the physical links are ignored. The agent is the system
whose physical links are neglected in a given account.
To see how this works in general, however, we have to
distinguish variants of the notion of agency.
B. Different notions of agency
In a wide sense, any physical system acting on a second
system and affecting it can be called an agent. But the
word ‘agency’ is commonly employed in a more restricted
sense, indicating the capacity of certain systems, such as
humans, to take independent, autonomous, intentional
decisions and act on these.
The ambiguity in the use of the term is reflected in the
philosophical debate about agency (see for instance [18]
and references there). From the perspective of physics,
the ambiguity refers to the assumptions about the rea-
sons for an agent to act in one way or the other. There is
a spectrum of (overlapping) possibilities, leading to dis-
tinct notions of agency, which can be denoted as follows.
We can call:
External agent: any system, when we simply disregard
the reasons for its behaviour. Example: in dealing
with the dynamics of the Moon’s surface, a me-
teorite that impacts on its surface is an external
agent.
Internal agent: a system governed by some complex in-
ternal dynamics which we could reconstruct. Ex-
ample: This computer is the agent that controls
that door.
Random agent: a system governed by a genuinely prob-
abilistic dynamics.
Independent agent: a system governed by an internal
(deterministic or probabilistic) dynamics, too com-
plex for us to reconstruct. Example: This man is
the agent that decides whether to open that door.
Supernatural agent: a system that does not satisfy nei-
ther deterministic nor probabilistic physical laws.
External agency is only a way of talking about external
physical links when we are not interested in accounting
for them. Random agency can be instantiated by quan-
tum theory. Human agency is an example of independent
agency [19, 20]. The existence of agency that does not
to satisfy neither deterministic nor probabilistic physical
laws (supernatural) would contradict our current under-
standing of our world I see no interest in considering it.
The most interesting case is independent agency, in par-
ticular when the agent can choose between alternatives
that affect the world differently. In Section IV we shall
see how a physical system can actually do so.
III. TIME ORIENTATION
Agency is time oriented: it affects the future, not the
past. What is the source of this time asymmetry? The
3answer is delicate, because it differs for different notions
of agency [15].
A. Perspectival time orientation
Let’s start with the simplest case. Consider an elastic
collision between a ball B1 and a ball B2. When it is hit
by B1, the ball B2 changes its velocity. Say the velocity
before the collision was ~vpast and after the collision it
becomes ~vfuture. We can say that B1 has acted on B2 and
the effect of this action is in the future: it has changed
~vpast into ~vfuture. This is a possible example of an action
affecting the future.
However, the physical laws governing the collision are
time reversible. There is nothing in the process itself
that picks up a time direction. At given past ~vpast , it is
the future to be affected by the act; but at given future
~vfuture, it is the past to be affected. That is: at fixed
past, the world with the collision and the world without
the collision have a different future; while at fixed future,
the world with the collision and the world without the
collision have a different past. We could equally describe
the same history backward in time, with the same laws,
and say that the effect of the interaction has been to
change the velocity from ~vfuture to ~vpast.
The reason we say that the collision affects the trajec-
tory of the particle B2 after the collision is only to be
found in the regard we give to the phenomenon. It is we
who are time oriented. In turn, the reason we take the
past as fixed is that we can remember it and we cannot
influence it, while we cannot remember the future and
we can influence it. Hence we consider the past states of
the two balls as given, and we say that the effect of the
collision is in the future. The distinction refers to what
we know, not to anything in the phenomenon itself. The
distinction is perspectival. As far the phenomenon alone
is concerned, it is purely linguistic: we simply call effect
what happens after the collision [21].
It is tempting to jump from this to saying that this is
all there is to say about the time orientation of agency:
it is perspectival, agency looks time oriented, but it is
only because we see it so. But that would be a mistake.
The reason is that we have simply displaced the prob-
lem: the collision does not distinguish cause froms effect,
but we do. And our distinction is rooted in our own
agency, which can affect the future but not the past. The
phenomena determined by us and our agency —and with
us a large class of other systems we call internal agents—
are definitely not time symmetric.
In particular, to have a different effect on the ball B2,
a different motion of the ball B1 is needed, while I can
now choose between different macroscopic futures given
the same macroscopic past. What is the source of time
orientation in this case?
B. Physical time orientation
It is not difficult to find the source of time-oriented
phenomena: the entire macroscopic world around us is
manifestly time oriented. We understand this time ori-
entation of the macro-world in terms of the second prin-
ciple (in a generalised sense, and including the past hy-
pothesis) which is the only ‘fundamental’ law that breaks
time-reversal invariance. There is no reason for agency
to be different, and there is no other source of time ori-
entation available in our universe (see below for a discus-
sion about quantum theory). Agency must therefore be
a macroscopic phenomenon governed by an entropy gra-
dient (and ultimately the past hypothesis of a primordial
low entropy that underpins it) [15, 16]. This must be the
ground for the orientation of complex agents like us.
This is the only possible answer to the question of the
origin of the time orientation of agency, in the context of
a naturalistic perspective. The main question I address
in this paper is how an entropy gradient can give rise to
the behaviour we recognise as agency. As we shall see
in the next Section, the additional ingredients needed for
this are surprisingly meagre.
The subtle point is the fact that it is the macroscopic
world to be time oriented. The micro-history of reality
happens to be such that in a direction of time (the ‘past’)
the microstate belonged to a low entropy macrostate.
(To even state time orientation we need to have a notion
of macrostates, namely a coarse graining.) Accordingly,
agency must be accounted form in terms of a macro-
scopic/microscopic distinction, in the sense of statistical
mechanics and thermodynamics.
This is not a distinction on the basis of size, scale, or
number of degrees of freedom; it is a distinction relative
to a set variables (called macroscopic), to which we have
access and that have a partially closed dynamics within
some approximation. That is, their behaviour can be
approximately determined without involving other vari-
ables. (Here I take low initial entropy, or the past hy-
pothesis, as given: I do not discuss the possibility for
itself to be perspectival, which is discussed in [22].)
Now, consider an internal agent. If we described it
in complete mechanical terms, the time orientation of
agency would again be just a linguistic choice. But, as
we have seen in the previous Section, an agent is precisely
a system of which we are disregarding part the dynamics.
When we describe a human being as an agent, we are ob-
viously not describing its complete microphysics. Hence,
the separation between manifest (macroscopic) degrees of
freedom and underlying (microscopic) ones that are not
accounted for is constitutive to the notion of independent
agency [19]. It is precisely this separation that underpins
the thermodynamical roots of agency’s time orientation.
The general situation is therefore clear: the root of
time orientation in an independent agent is thermo-
dynamical irreversibility. This underpins independent
agency, hence our own sense of openness of the future.
This, in turn, gives us the perspective to read even trivial
4symmetric interaction in a time oriented manner.
What is missing is to unravel a mechanism showing
how the thermodynamical irreversibility can account for
the time orientation of agency and the openness of the
future it implies. This is what is done in the next section.
IV. MODELLING THE THERMODYNAMICAL
IRREVERSIBILITY OF AGENCY
Consider an independent agent: a complex unpre-
dictable macroscopic system. Say that in the interval
between the times ta and tb it acts on the macroscopic
world causing an effect. Say it can choose between N
alternatives in its action. Consider the time evolution of
the macroscopic state of the world, including the agent
itself, and call it Qi(t) with i = 1, ..., N labelling the N
possible evolutions (or ‘branches’) of the macro-world.
The branches have the same history before the action
and differ after-wise, that is
Qi(t) = Qj(t), for all i, j and t < ta,
Qi(t) 6= Qj(t), for some i, j and t > tb. (1)
This describes what an independent agent, capable of
choosing, does.
The internal dynamics of the agent can be a complex
computation about possible futures, based on the mem-
ory and a value system incorporated in the agent’s mem-
ory or structure (more on this below); it can be a random
process influenced by the indeterminism of quantum me-
chanics (more on this below), or by microscopic statistical
fluctuations; or it can simply be any classical dynamics
too complex for us to reconstruct. The relative weight
of these components in the indeterminacy of the macro-
scopic evolution is irrelevant from the point of view of
physics, because in all cases it simply amounts to disre-
garding some physical links in the evolution.
Let’s disregard for the moment quantum indetermin-
ism. We picture the situation as follows: a macroscopic
deterministic dynamics gives a good approximation to
the dynamics of each Qi(t) for any t, but not in the in-
terval ta − tb during which agency acts.
The key point is that this is not in contradiction with
classical determinism, because there is a large number
of micro-histories q(t) compatible with anyone of the
branches of the evolution in (1). Hence there is noth-
ing mysterious in the branching itself: it is just a case
where the causal closure of the (approximate!) macro-
scopic dynamics breaks down (see also [13]). In general,
physics is non-linear and large effects of small changes are
well known to happen. From this perspective, agency is
simply a situation where scale separation does not hold:
nothing puzzling here.
What is puzzling, on the other hand, is why the
branching is towards the future. As discussed, since the
microphysics is time reversal invariant, the reason for the
time orientation of the branching can only be the time
asymmetry of the macrophysics, namely the second prin-
ciple. How does this connection work?
Since choosing is irreversible it cannot happen without
entropy increase. Therefore during the interval ta − tb
there must be an entropy increase ∆S > 0. On the other
hand, suppose we observe the macroscopic evolution. Be-
fore the time ta we have no information about which
branch will the system follow. After the time tb we can
see which branch has been realised, hence we have novel
information. Where does the information come from?
The only possible answer is that I is paid for by the in-
crease in entropy ∆S.
A model illustrating how this can happen was devel-
oped in [17] to account for the relation between memory
and entropy. Let us adapt it here to the present case.
Consider two systems: a system A (Agent) at temper-
ature Ta and a systemW (World) at a lower temperature
Tw < Ta. Assume that the two interact only occasionally,
say on average once every T seconds, and weakly, namely
with a long thermalization time τa ≫ T . Furthermore,
say that W , in turn, is formed by N subsystems, also
interacting weakly among themselves, but with a global
thermalization time τw ≪ T . Remarkably, these meagre
ingredients are sufficient to model an agent.
From the definition of the thermalization time (on av-
erage dTa/dt = −Ta/τa) the average change of tempera-
ture δTa during the interval T , hence at each interaction,
is given by
δTa
Ta
= −
T
τa
(2)
Assuming for simplicity that the heat capacity of W is
infinite and calling C the heat capacity of A, the aver-
age exchanged energy in one interaction is Q = −CδTa,
giving
Q = CTa
T
τa
. (3)
This is heat, since it comes from the thermal energy of A.
Since τw ≪ T , in a typical configuration the N subsys-
tems ofW have thermalised and have equal mean energy,
say Ei = E, where i = 1, ..., N . We take the N quanti-
ties Ei to be macroscopic observables. With a frequency
dictated by T , the interaction between A and a random
variable of W happens. Because of the second law, it is
more likely that energy is transferred from A to W than
viceversa. On average, at each interaction an amount Q
of energy is transferred to one of the N components of
W , say i = iˆ. After the interaction and for a time of the
order of τw, the energy of one of the N components of
W is higher than the others. Therefore the macroscopic
state of the system around an interaction happening at
a time to is described by
Ei(t) = E, for t < to, (4)
Ei(t) = E, for i 6= iˆ and t > to, (5)
Ei(t) = E +Q, for i = iˆ and t > to, (6)
5which satisfies (1), and is therefore an example of agency.
Thus, the simple thermodynamical ingredients above can
give rise to a system that chooses and influences the fu-
ture.
The interaction selects one out of N alternative, pro-
ducing an amount
I = log2 N (7)
of information. The process is irreversible, because heat
moves from a hot to a cold body, and produces an entropy
increase.
∆S ∼
Q
Tw
−
Q
Ta
∼ C
T
τa
∆T
Tw
, (8)
where ∆T = Ta − Tw. A necessary condition for the
information to be accounted for is
I < ∆S, (9)
because information must come from somewhere. Using
the equations above, this gives
N < 2
T
τa
C∆T
Tw . (10)
This equation bounds the possibility of choosing between
alternatives, at given thermodynamical parameters. In
particular, it shows that a non-vanishing temperature dif-
ference ∆T is needed to have a choice.
To get a sense of this bound, consider it in a very simple
case. Consider a minimal choice between 2 alternatives,
namely N = 2; using T ≪ τa we have
C∆T ≫ k Tw (11)
where we have reinserted the Boltzmann constant k 6= 1
for clarity. The left hand side of this equation is the
excess thermal energy in the agent, while the right hand
side is the average energy per degree of freedom in the
world. That is: in order to be able to choose, the agents
must have enough energy to stand up above the thermal
energy of the world.
Crucially, there is no reduction of entropy in choosing:
there is increase in entropy, contrary to what appears
in the picture where the physics of the agent is disre-
garded. Choosing is a conventional irreversible process,
and it happens because it is statistically favoured, as all
irreversible processes do.
Before concluding, we comment on two points that we
left open: top-down causation and the role of quantum
theory.
A. Top down causation
Defenders of top-down causation point out that it may
be possible to account for the choice of an agent in terms
of high-level concepts. For instance, a choice can be mo-
tivated by a value system, a calculation about the future,
respecting a rule or a moral obligation, knowledge, mem-
ory, a computer program, or similar high-level notions.
This is obviously true, and does not alter the picture
given above, for the following reason.
High-level concepts make sense autonomously and per-
mit us to predict events, but they nevertheless supervene
on microphysics. That is, two situations that differ in
their high-level description cannot be identical in their
microphysics. For instance: it makes sense to under-
stand the behaviour of a computer in terms of its soft-
ware rather than thinking in terms of the forces on its
elementary particles; but to have different software we
necessarily need a different configuration in the elemen-
tary particles. Equivalently: it makes sense to under-
stand the behaviour of a person in terms of her moral
values, but to have different moral values must be ac-
companied by something different in the microphysics,
perhaps in some synapses in the brain.
Now, if high-level concepts are sufficient to account
for behaviour, this is a normal case of causal closure of
a coarse-grained account of the events. High-level con-
cepts, from this perspective, are normal macroscopic vari-
ables. We are thus in the case of an internal agent, for
which it is possible to account for the choice: there is
no entropy production in the choice, and the choice is
fully determined by the macrophysics. A computer play-
ing chess, for instance, choses a move on the basis of
rules. This is an unproblematic case of causal closure of
a macroscopic description.
If, on the contrary, high level concepts are not suffi-
cient to account for behaviour, then we are back to the
micro/macro context. Something else is doing the choice:
if it is not the macrophysics, it must be the microphysics.
There are always very many micro-histories compatible
with any given high-level account, leaving space for the
branching.
Neither case conflicts with the causal closure of the mi-
croscopic physics. Ultimately, agency is always nothing
else than ignoring some physical links.
B. Quantum theory
I have framed the discussion in terms of classical me-
chanics, because including probabilities complicates the
language. But nothing substantial changes in the above
if quantum mechanics is taken into account.
Microscopic time reversal invariance is not broken by
quantum randomness [23, 24]. The predictions of quan-
tum mechanics are formulated in terms transition proba-
bilities. These do not distinguish between past and future
and are time reversal invariant (CPT invariant in quan-
tum field theory). The discussion in this paper, on the
other hand, clarifies the origin of the time asymmetry in
our conventional use of quantum theory. We routinely
interpret quantum transition probabilities as time ori-
ented, namely we routinely read them as probabilities
for future events given past events; but this is perspec-
6tival. It is because we are agents that can influence the
future, immersed in a time oriented macroscopic world,
that we do so. Therefore the time orientation of the com-
mon reading of quantum probabilities is just perspectival.
As shown, this perspectival time orientation, in turn, is
ultimately sourced by the arrow of time of the second
principle, via our own agency.
Quantum theory does not change anything regarding
the distinction between microphysics and macrophysics,
either. For the sake of the current discussion quantum
indeterminism can be treated as due to unaccounted de-
grees of freedom. If one wish to, one can even do so ex-
plicitly by using an interpretation of quantum theory like
the de Broglie-Bohm hidden variable one, where indeter-
minism is indeed statistical ignorance, or Many Worlds,
where indeterminism is indexical, namely ignorance of
the branch in which we are located. Alternatively, one
may simply remember that in order to affect the macro-
world, quantum indeterminism needs decoherence, which
is precisely based on disregarding degrees of freedom.
Whether the causal closure of the macroscopic descrip-
tion of the world is in principle accounted by some under-
lying classical deterministic microphysics or by quantum
randomness is irrelevant for the understanding of agency.
V. CONCLUSIONS: MEMORY AND THE
CREATION OF INFORMATION
We have a strong feeling that we cannot influence the
past, but we can influence the future. This seems to con-
flict with the time (CPT) reversal invariance of funda-
mental physics. But is not. We have this feeling because
truly we can affect the macroscopic future but not the
macroscopic past. The macroscopic world we work with
has a fixed past determined by abundant present traces
and memories [17], while it is compatible with a number
of different futures, that do depend on what happens in
our brain. This is the openness of the future that our
feeling veridically captures.
This openness of the future leaves ample space for sub-
tle high level processes to influence the macroscopic fu-
ture. Our sense of being free to decide is clearly rooted
here. It is in this sense, that, as Ismael puts it: ‘Physics
Makes Us Free’ [20].
The microscopic account is a wholly different story, but
is of little relevance for our experience and feelings, since,
by definition, we do not access it.
Independent agency is a description of the macroscopic
dynamics of an interaction between an agent and the
world which: (i) is unpredictable, (ii) is irreversible,
(iii) produces a (macroscopically) detectable effect on the
world in the future, and (iv) produces information. There
are remarkable similarities between this and the model
for traces, or ‘memories’, described in [17].
Both memory and agency are events that leave a trace
in the macroscopic domain. The difference is that the
roles are in a certain sense exchanged: in the case of
agency, it is the agent that leaves a trace on the exter-
nal macroscopic world; while memory is a trace left by
the world on the memory system. Both phenomena need
long thermalization times, namely quasi-stable system,
to hold the memory or the effect of the action. Both need
a disequilibrium in the past, to account for orientation
and irreversibility. Both can be understood as macro-
scopic phenomena pertaining to a coarse grained picture
of the world, and make no sense at the microscopic level
(except in metaphorical ‘anthropocentric’ language).
Agency is time oriented because it is a macroscopic
phenomenon driven by an entropy gradient (hence ulti-
mately by the past hypothesis). The model presented in
Section IV shows that system separation, past tempera-
ture difference, and long thermalization times are meagre
elements nevertheless sufficient to model this thermody-
namical roots of agency. In turn, our time orientation as
agents compels us to look at mechanical interactions in
a time oriented manner [15].
The most interesting aspects of the two phenomena is
that they both produce information. In agency, infor-
mation can be recognised, in Shannon’s sense, as the in-
stantiation of one among a number of possibilities. In the
case of memory, information is what Shannon calls ‘rel-
ative information’: physical correlation between a past
macroscopic event and its trace.
In both cases, the information is generated by increas-
ing entropy. Eq (10) gives the maximal information that
can be produced in choosing, at given thermodynamical
parameters. It analogous to bound on the information
produced by the formation of memory derived in [17].
Low entropy is a form of information because a lower
entropy state amounts to a more selective information
about the microphysics (a zero entropy macrostate is
a state that has maximal information about the mi-
crophysics: the microstate is unique). Memory and
agency utilise the information stored in low entropy and
translate it into information readable in the macroscopic
world. In fact, they both can be viewed as mechanisms
that generate macroscopic information.
Macroscopic information, stored in human memory, in
DNA molecules, in computer messages, in books, in nar-
ratives, in software codes, in records of any form, must
have been ultimately produced by physical mechanisms.
Traces of the past and decisions by agents —possibly in
turn themselves affected by memories of the past— are
major sources of everything we call information. In both
cases, information is created, in a statistically favoured
manner, at the expenses of low entropy, in accordance
with the second principle. In a fully thermalised situa-
tion, there is no space for memories or for agents.
The entire informational universe formed by the
biosphere and by culture can therefore perhaps be
viewed, from this perspective, as formed by information
produced by a mechanism of the form described here.
***
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